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W 
e  address  a  well-known  but  inffequently discussed  problem  in  the  quantitative  study  of 
international conpict: Despite immense data collections, prestigious journals,  and sophisticated 
analyses, empirical  findings in the literature on international conflict are often unsatisfying. Many 
statistical results change ffom  article to article and specijication to specijication. Accurate forecasts  are 
nonexistent. In this article we  offer a conjecture about one source of  this problem:  The causes of  conflict, 
theorized to be important but often found  to be small or ephemeral, are indeed tiny for  the vast majority of 
dyads, but they are  large, stable, and  replicable wherever the ex ante probability of  conflict is large. This 
simple idea has an unexpectedly rich array of observable implications, all consistent with the literature. We 
directly test our conjecture by formulating a statistical model that includes its critical features.  Our approach, 
a version of a "neural network" model, uncovers some interesting structural features  of international conflict 
and,  as  one  evaluative  measure, forecasts  substantially  better than any previous  effort. Moreover,  this 
im~rovement  comes at little cost, and it is easv to evaluate whether the model is a statistical improvement 
over the simpler models commonly used. 
D 
espite  immense  data  collections,  prestigious 
journals, and sophisticated analyses, empirical 
findings in the quantitative literature on inter- 
national conflict are frequently unsatisfying. Statistical 
results appear  to change from  article to article and 
specification to specification. Any relationships usually 
are statistically weak, with wide confidence intervals, 
and  they  vary  considerably with  small  changes  in 
specification, index construction, and  choice  of  data 
frame.l 
Instead of  uncovering new, durable, systematic pat- 
terns, as is the case in most other quantitative subfields 
of  political science (and public health,  of  which  this 
field is also a part [King and Murray 2000]), students of 
international conflict are left wrestling with their data 
to eke out something they can label a finding. As a 
consequence, those with deep qualitative knowledge of 
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It  is not our intention to provide  a literature review. Examples of 
the fragility of findings and  sensitivity of exact specification may be 
found in Thompson and  Tucker's (1997) exchange with Farber  and 
Gowa  (1997) and  Mansfield  and  Snyder  (1997) on  the  role  of 
democracy in preventing conflict, or  in Oneal and  Russett  (1997), 
Barbieri  (1996),  and  Beck, Katz, and  Tucker (1998) on the role of 
trade in preventing  conflict. We stress that  our  examples involve 
current best practice, so  the problems we mention are not the result 
of  data errors or simple methodological mistakes. 
the subject are rarely persuaded by  conclusions from 
quantitative  works  (see  Bueno  de  Mesquita  1981; 
Geller  and  Singer  1998; Levy  1989; Rosenau  1976; 
Vasquez 1993). The field has a number of  important 
successes to its credit, such as the democratic peace, 
and many important and very promising research pro- 
grams, but  the discontinuity between  the beliefs  of 
most experts and many quantitative results remains. 
A symptom of  the fragility of  the various models is 
their poor forecasting performance. To our knowledge, 
no legitimate statistical model (using annual data) has 
ever forecast an international conflict with greater than 
0.50 probability, and certainly none has done so while 
also  being  correct.  Political scientists have  long  es- 
chewed forecasting in favor of  an emphasis on causal 
explanation,  and  it  is  clear  that  any  proposed  new 
method must allow for causal interpretation as well as 
improved forecasting. But causal theories are consid- 
erably harder  to verify than forecasts, and  forecasts 
have the advantage of being observable implications of 
the same theories as the causal hypotheses. This means 
that accurate forecasts can be used at least in part to 
verify  claims about  causal structure. In particular,  a 
claim  to have  found  a  causal explanation that  is  a 
structural feature of  the world but changes unpredict- 
ably over time (and so is of no help in forecasting) is of 
dubious validity and marginal value. 
Although political scientists are less likely to evalu- 
ate models by their forecasting properties than are, say, 
economists, forecasting properties underlie all evalua- 
tions  of  the performance  of  statistical models.  For 
example, all  likelihood or goodness-of-fit assessment 
procedures merely ask whether one specification has 
superior  in-sample "forecasting"  properties.  Yet,  all 
statistical analysts must be concerned about whether 
they are taking advantage of  some idiosyncratic fea- 
tures  of  the  data  to  improve fit  at  the  expense of 
detecting  structure and  hence  out-of-sample perfor- 
mance. To guard against this problem, which is more of 
a worry with powerful statistical models, out-of-sample Improving Quantitative Studies of  International Conflict: A Conjecture  March 2000 
forecast  accuracy  is  generally  considered  the  gold 
standard for model assessment. Even if  we  have  no 
interest  in  prediction  per  se,  the  poor  forecasting 
performance of  standard models indicates that we can 
improve  on  them  to  provide  better  knowledge  of 
real-world causal relationships. Forecasting is thus of 
critical, albeit indirect, interest as a key test of whether 
we have really found causal structure.= 
The scholarly attacks on  this problem  have  come 
from  every  angle. The most  venerable  tradition has 
been  to improve the data  and measures  of  interna- 
tional conflict and its correlates (Jones, Bremer, and 
Singer 1996). Others have modified existing statistical 
models to accommodate some of the special features of 
conflict data (Beck and Tucker 1998; King 1989; King 
and Zeng 1999). Yet others have attempted to derive 
statistical models from formally stated rational choice 
theories based on the motivations of  states, political 
leaders,  or  other  domestic  actors  (Signorino  1999; 
Smith 1998). We believe progress will  ultimately re- 
quire advances on all three fronts as well as a conver- 
gence in theoretical and statistical models and data. 
Our approach is based on the belief that a portion of 
the problem  lies in  a somewhat overlooked but  key 
substantive  issue  that  is  reflected  in  the  mismatch 
between available data and the set of  statistical meth- 
ods commonly applied. International conflict is a rare 
event, and the processes that drive it where it is more 
common  are  likely  to be very  different from  those 
elsewhere. As  a result, many  qualitative researchers 
expect the relationships to be highly nonlinear, mas- 
sively  interactive, and  heavily  context  dependent  or 
contingent.  Because  these  characteristics  would  be 
missed with  standard  statistical approaches,  particu- 
larly the typical linear-normal models imported from 
studies of  American politics, we  adopt a form of  the 
highly flexible "neural  network model."  This type of 
model is well suited to data with complex, nonlinear, 
and  contingent relationships. It is  not  a panacea  or 
always appropriate, but it provides an immensely useful 
tool that has not been sufficiently exploited in this field 
to date. 
As an analogy, consider the use  of  survey data to 
assess the consequences of  lifestyle on the onset of  a 
relatively rare disease. A supposedly healthful lifestyle 
may be helpful in warding off  the disease for everyone, 
but  a simple logit of  disease on  lifestyle (and other 
explanatory variables) would,  at best,  show  a weak 
relationship,  since  most  survey respondents  are un- 
likely to get the disease in any event. Thus, the logit 
analysis of  disease, like a logit of  conflict, will average 
many small effects with a few large ones. If  we could 
Of course, accurate forecasts of international conflict would be of 
tremendous practical value, as a large portion of the foreign policy 
bureaucracy in many countries is devoted to this task. A quantitative 
"expert system" to help guide policymakers could be of considerable 
use.  Forecasts  of  political  conflict  also  would  be  of  interest  to 
political-business risk analysts, public health researchers, and many 
others.  In informal  discussions, several former U.S.  policymakers 
indicated that, aside from occasional commissioned studies, no such 
quantitative expert system is presently in use. To our surprise, they 
also indicated that even annual forecasts would be of  considerable 
use in policymaking. 
predict  that behavioral changes would  have a major 
effect on avoiding disease for those who are at greater 
risk  for  it,  this  would  be  a  great  accomplishment. 
Similarly, if we could show that autocracy dramatically 
increases the likelihood of  conflict for dyads at risk of 
conflict, this  also would  be  important. In  short, we 
conjecture that many quantitative international conflict 
studies lack robustness because they look only for the 
effects of variables averaged over all dyads, whereas in 
reality the effects vary enormously over dyads and are 
only substantively large for those already at relatively 
high risk of  conflict. 
We find that our models are able to predict interna- 
tional conflict to a degree. Whereas all previous models 
are unable to predict the occurrence of  any conflict, 
our out-of-sample forecasts pick up about 17% of these 
disputes. There is still a long way  to go to produce 
highly accurate forecasts of  all these rare and unusual 
events, if  that is ever even possible, but our analyses 
confirm that  there is  structure in these  data. As for 
causal interpretation of  the underlying structure, our 
more appropriate techniques find hints of  robust and 
replicable patterns. 
In the next section, we propose a simple conjecture 
that seeks to remedy some of the problems found in the 
quantitative analysis of  conflict. We believe the idea 
may explain some of the anomalies and nonfindings in 
the literature and why  our model is  able to forecast 
reasonably well. It also highlights the features that an 
appropriate  method  would  need  to  uncover  stable 
patterns  in  this  field.  We  then  discuss  appropriate 
methods, apply them to real data, and offer  conclu- 
sions. The Appendix contains some technical details on 
Bayesian neural network models. 
THE PROBLEM WITH CONFLICT STUDIES 
A Conjecture 
Our conjecture about conflict studies is quite simple, 
and aspects of it are implied in much of  the literature. 
The idea is that the effects of  most explanatory vari- 
ables are undetectably small for the vast majority of 
dyads, but they are large, stable, and replicable when 
the ex ante probability of conflict is large. For example, 
Swaziland and St. Lucia have essentially no chance of 
going to war today. Should either become slightly less 
democratic, conceivably the probability of  war would 
increase a bit, but the increase would be so small that 
it would be undetectable and unimportant. In contrast, 
if  Iran and Iraq were to become slightly more demo- 
cratic, then the probability that they would go to war 
might drop dramatically. If our conjecture is right, then 
the effects of the causes of  conflict differ by  dyad, with 
trivially small effects for the vast majority and larger 
effects  for  a  few.  That  is,  it  is  the  effects  of  the 
explanatory variables, not  merely  the  levels  of  the 
variables, that vary. 
To  be  clear,  this  conjecture  addresses  the  large 
literature on country-year dyads. Different processes 
and theories might apply to data based on daily events 
series or other more finely grained data collections. We American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 1 
do believe that our simple conjecture may help explain 
diverse features of  the quantitative literature on the 
causes of international conflict. At the least, it appears 
to be consistent with several observable implications. 
First, most  scholars use  statistical procedures  that 
assume the effects of  their  explanatory variables are 
nearly the same for all dyads. (Some use interaction 
effects that allow more variation over the dyads, but the 
degree of  variation represented is still quite limited.) 
The estimates these analyses produce are roughly the 
average of  essentially zero effects for the vast majority 
of  observations and larger effects for a tiny fraction of 
the cases. Unless the effect is enormous in the small set 
of  dyads  with  a  high  ex  ante  probability  of  war, 
estimates from most analyses will appear very small or 
resemble random noise. Indeed, small to nonexistent 
and highly variable effects are dominant in the litera- 
ture. 
Second, when effects are huge in the dyads with high 
ex  ante probability of  war,  the average over  all  the 
dyads is large enough to be detected reliably with most 
methods. (Nonetheless, the estimated effect would be 
too large for most dyads and far too small for a few.) 
Some uncontroversial variables in this at-risk subset of 
dyads include contiguity and time since the last war; 
indeed, these are among the few variables that often 
give reasonably robust results across specifications. 
Third, if  only a few observations have large effects, 
then small changes in the set of  dyads included in  a 
statistical analysis will  sometimes have disproportion- 
ate effects on the results. This also appears true and 
may  account for some of  the apparent instability of 
results in the literature from article to article. 
Fourth, a similar observable implication results from 
the  strong  priors  most  scholars  derive  from  their 
considerable  qualitative  knowledge  about  the  field. 
What  can we  expect to find when  strong priors  are 
combined with statistical methods that assume causal 
effects are the same for all dyads and when data have a 
low  signal-to-noise ratio?  We  expect  researchers  to 
push their data analyses extremely hard  in  search of 
effects they believe are there but are difficult to find. 
Unfortunately, this would make the results differ from 
investigator to investigator, just as they seem to, since 
answers will  depend very sensitively on otherwise mi- 
nor coding decisions. 
Fifth,  some  scholars  make  coding  decisions  that 
seem consistent with our conjecture when they discard 
all dyads but those deemed "politically relevant" or "at 
risk," in other words, those with a high ex ante proba- 
bility of  war.3 If  our hypothesis is correct, then these 
coding  decisions  are  problematic  methodologically. 
Such problems  are often recognized by  the authors, 
who have little choice but to put some restrictions on 
an otherwise endless data collection. The difficulty is 
that  coding  rules  amount  to  dropping  many  cases 
without  war  and  a  few  with  war,  which  in  some 
instances may generate two types of  selection bias. (1) 
Intentional selection may bias the effect upward if  the 
See Bremer 1992 for this argument in its modern statistical guise 
and Richardson 1960 for some early intuition. 
relevant  population  to which  one is  inferring is  all 
dyads and otherwise may correctly increase the effect. 
(2) Except when the definition of  "politically relevant" 
is  clearly based on one of  the explanatory variables 
(e.g., Maoz 1996), these rules also select on the depen- 
dent variable, which biases estimates of the probability 
of  conflict. Whatever the goal of the inference, studies 
that address the problem by selecting cases in this way 
may give answers that are too small or too noisy, which 
appears to be the case throughout the literature. The 
results  from these  selection rules will  be  somewhat 
stronger than when using the entire data set but not as 
large as qualitative experts expect. Indeed, this seems 
to fit the literature. 
Finally, if  our conjecture is right, then the applica- 
tion of an appropriate statistical technique will confirm 
the existence of sizable and robust effects in the high ex 
ante probability of  war  dyads  and  tiny  effects  else- 
where.  For  many  variables  at  least,  the  direction, 
magnitude, and nature of  the large effects should not 
be wildly inconsistent with our qualitative knowledge of 
international relations, unless there is a clear reason. If 
this  method  indeed  finds  real  features  of  the  in- 
ternational system, rather than some idiosyncratic  sam- 
ple  characteristics that  result  from  our  specification 
choices or coding rules, then out-of-sample forecasts 
ought to predict similar patterns in the next data set. 
The first five of these observable implications of  our 
conjecture  are consistent with observations from the 
literature. Testing the sixth will occupy most of  the rest 
of  this article. 
According to our  idea,  international conflict  data 
differ from other rare events data sets in two ways. The 
effect of any single explanatory variable changes mark- 
edly as a function of  changes in the other explanatory 
variables  (that  is,  there  are strong  and complicated 
interactions), and the dependent variables are, in prin- 
ciple,  powerful  enough  to  predict  whether  conflict 
occurs if the appropriate model is used. Some other 
rare events data, such as in epidemiological studies of 
disease, may fit this description, but only if  all these 
characteristics apply.4 
STATISTICAL MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CONFLICT 
Relative to other types of data and processes studied in 
political science, international conflict data have some 
unusual characteristics. They are based on thousands 
of dyads (combinations of countries taken pairwise) or 
directed dyads (the actions of  A toward B and of  B 
toward A are separate observations in the same data 
set). Whether the universe of dyads should include only 
originators of  conflict, all nations, or some group in 
between is by  no means clear. Most outcome variables 
The leading alternative explanation for the problems in this field is 
that the data are so bad that it is impossible to discover patterns. 
Data problems clearly exist (e.g., Vasquez 1993), and may be more 
severe than in other fields, but they are not unique to international 
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are dichotomous. The data often concern rare events, 
with  hundreds  of  times  more  0's  (peace)  than  1's 
(conflict). Often the explanatory variables are neither 
dichotomous nor quite continuous, with distributions 
that are asymmetric or with multiple mass points (such 
as  at  the  end  or  midpoint).  The  indices often  are 
necessarily complicated combinations of  diverse mea- 
sures. In addition, assuming our conjecture is correct, 
very small parts of very large data sets contain most of 
the interesting information. 
The statistical method we introduce here is a version 
of a neural network model, first introduced to political 
scientists by  Schrodt (1995) and Zeng (1999, 2000).5 
There is  an immense literature supporting this tech- 
nique in engineering, computer science, statistics, psy- 
chology,  linguistics, neuroscience, medicine, finance, 
and other fields. Neural network analysts have adopted 
an extensive and essentially unique terminology. The 
language  is  useful  because  it  helps  emphasize  the 
rough analogies between these statistical models and 
some theoretical models of the way human brains may 
work. Using this language to describe concepts known 
to political scientists by  other names can be counter- 
productive. Therefore, we  introduce these models as 
straightfonvard  generalizations  of  logistic  models, 
which are the most commonly used statistical models of 
international conflict. 
In the following subsections, we make the transition 
from logit to our neural network models. We examine 
various issues related to estimation, interpretation, and 
inference with our model, and we introduce the main 
ideas  of  Bayesian  methods  for  neural  networks 
adopted here. We also discuss several potential objec- 
tions to neural networks. 
From Logit to Neural Networks 
Our dependent variable, Yi, takes on a value of  1 if 
dyad i (i = 1, . . . ,  N) is engaged in an international 
conflict, 0 if  it  is  at peace. If  conflict and peace are 
coded as mutually exclusive and exhaustive (which we 
make true by  definition), then a Bernoulli distribution 
fully describes this variable. The only parameter of  a 
Bernoulli  distribution  is  ni,  the  probability  of  an 
international conflict. Let a vector of  a constant term 
and k explanatory variables be denoted Xi = (1, XIi, 
XZi,  0.. 7  Xki). 
The next step is to specify the relationship between 
ni and Xi. The simplest possibility is a linear function, 
which results in what is known as the linear probability 
model: 
5 General references on neural networks include Rumelhart et al. 
(1986), Muller and Reinhardt (1990), and Hertz, Krogh, and Palmer 
(1991). Detailed discussion of  neural networks as statistical models 
can be found in, for example, Bishop (1995), Cheng and Titterington 
(1994), Kuan and White (1994), Ripley (1996), and White (1992). A 
recent application in political science is Eisinga, Franses,  and Van 
Dijk  (1998), who  estimate  a  constrained  neural  network  model 
similar to a generalized additive model. While this  application  is 
completely different from  our conjecture,  it  does show the great 
flexibility of neural nets and their applicability to many complicated 
data problems. 
where XJ.3 is merely a matrix expression for the linear 
relationship between ni and Xi, 
and the (k + 1) x 1  vector p includes a constant term 
and  k  weights  (or  coefficients)  on  each  of  the  k 
explanatory variables.  The problem  with  the  linear 
probability model is  that  it  can generate impossible 
values of  ni (greater than 1 or less than 0), so even 
values within the correct range near the boundaries are 
questionable. Moreover, the full posterior distribution 
for ni  generated by  the linear probability model never 
makes sense in any application because at least some 
density  always  falls  outside  the unit  interval. These 
problems were known long ago, and the linear model 
was  almost entirely supplanted by  logit models when 
these became computationally feasible. 
The logit model is similar to the linear probability 
model except for the functional form: 
The logit  model  maps  the  linear  functional  form 
XiP, which can take on any value, into the [0,1] interval 
required for ni  by  applying the logit function. The vast 
majority of  analyses in conflict studies use some form 
of  this method. For our purposes, it is  important  to 
recognize that the second line of  equation 2 specifies 
the underlying probability of  conflict,  ni, as  a logit 
function of  a linear function of Xi, 
The logit is thus a generalization of  the linear proba- 
bility  model,  created  by  adding  an  extra  level  of 
hierarchy. Our neural network model will generalize 
the logit by  adding an additional level of  hierarchy. 
The logistic model in equation 2 improves on simple 
linear probability models by  avoiding impossible prob- 
ability values and assuming a more plausible relation- 
ship between the explanatory variables and the proba- 
bility  of  an outcome. The effect of  each explanatory 
variable varies across observations, however, and de- 
pends on the values of other explanatory variables only 
slightly more than does the linear model. These effects 
also depend only trivially on the ex ante probability of 
conflict (see Nagler 1991). One way to look at changes 
in the effects of explanatory variables is to examine the 
derivative of  the probability ni with respect to one of 
the explanatory variables, say, XIi. For linear models 
this derivative is  p,,  which is obviously constant. For 
logit models, the derivative is ni(l - ni)p1, which is 
better. But since mi is within a small range above zero 
for  all  but  a few  observations (and,  given  the  logit 
model's inflexibility, virtually all observations in prac- 
tice),  this is  a highly restrictive and  nearly constant American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 1 
specification.  To avoid  this  weakness, two  different 
types of  generalizations might be considered, either of 
which would be an improvement, but neither of which 
is sufficient. 
First,  we  might  specify  a  random  effects  model. 
Instead  of  leaving P fixed  at one set of  values, as in 
equation 2, we  could  let  it  vary  randomly over  the 
observations in  some form, such as  pi  =  P*  + q. 
Although some assumption about randomness may be 
better than logit's more restrictive assumption of  con- 
stant effects, our conjecture is not that the coefficients 
vary randomly across dyads; rather, they vary system- 
atically with the ex  ante probability of  conflict as a 
function of complicated conjunctions of  all the explan- 
atory variables. 
Second, standard interaction effects can be applied. 
For example, we might let the effect Pd of  democracy 
Xdi be a function of whether the states in the dyad are 
contiguous Xci, by  specifying, say, Pdi = yo + yJci. 
Substituting this expression back into the second line of 
equation 2 produces an interaction effect that is easy to 
estimate: Merely include XdiXci  as an additional vari- 
able in Xi and use  any standard logit package. This 
strategy will work in some cases, but it requires a good 
deal of  prior knowledge of  the types of interactions to 
specify.  If  one  does  not  have  sufficiently  detailed 
knowledge, then the number of  interactions one would 
include generally would not be precisely estimable with 
available data. In fact, too many interaction terms can 
result in severe problems of  numerical instability due 
to  colinearity.  In  conflict  data,  massive  interaction 
effects are suspected, most of  which are concentrated 
in tiny areas of the parameter space. Standard interac- 
tion-based logit models are too restrictive, require too 
many interactive terms,  and  do not  address the ex- 
pected degree of  nonlinearity. 
Our preference for an approach to this problem is 
the massively interactive and highly nonlinear neural 
network model, in particular, the single hidden layer 
feed-forward  perceptron.  This  biological  language 
sounds  complicated,  but  it  can  be  expressed  as  a 
statistical model that is  a straightforward generaliza- 
tion of  the logit model. 
Logit models use an "S-shaped" curve to approxi- 
mate the relationship between the probability, ni, and 
the explanatory variables,  Xi. Imagine how much better 
the approximation could be  if  more  than  one  such 
curve were used simultaneously, each with a different 
curvature  and  orientation; roughly  speaking, that  is 
what neural network models allow. In order to approx- 
imate the relationship between ni andxi  with a set of 
M logit curves, we use a neural network model with the 
same distribution  as but  a  different functional form 
from the logit and linear probability models: 
This neural network model is a type of  discrete choice 
model that differs from the logit only in the shape of 
the curve. It is easiest to compare this relationship with 
the standard logit in  the special case when M = 1, 
since the second and third lines of equation 3 are then 
just  a  logit  function  of  a  linear  function  of  a  logit 
function of  a linear function: 
The  larger  the value  chosen  for  M  (known  in  the 
literature as the number of  "hidden neurons," but of 
course nothing is hidden), the more logit curves are 
used at the third level of generalization and, as a result, 
the larger variety of  shapes the entire expression can 
approximate. 
To be more specific, P in the logit model in equation 
2  is  a  (k  +  1)  X  1 vector  of  effect  parameters 
(corresponding to a constant term and the weights on 
the k explanatory variables). After the p's  are multi- 
plied by  their  respective Xi's  and  summed up,  logit 
(XiP) is then one number, which we also label IT,.  In 
contrast, the p(,), . . . ,  P(M) parameters in the second 
and third  lines of  equation 3 are each (k + 1) X  1 
vectors, so that each expresses a different weighting of 
the k explanatory variables. Then the logit function is 
applied  to each  of  the  different weighting  schemes 
XiP(l), .  .  . , XiP(M  to yield  a  set  of  M  numbers: 
logit(XiPi1)), . . . , logit(xiP(,,).  A weighted  sum of 
these M numbers is taken (with the y's  as adjustable 
weights in this linear expression), and the logit is taken 
one final time to make sure that the entire expression 
yields a number for ni that is between 0 and 1. The 
result is, as we shall see below, a remarkably flexible 
functional form. 
Neural networks meet the needs of conflict research 
because  they  allow  the  effect  of  each  explanatory 
variable to differ markedly over the dyads, as required 
by our conjecture about international conflict. As in the 
case of  linear probability and logit models, this can be 
made clear by  examining the partial derivatives of  ni 
with respect to the independent variables. After some 
straightforward calculus, this yields 
where  h  indexes  explanatory variable  h  in  Xi  and 
element h in pj. From this expression, it is clear that 
our neural network model allows much more range in 
the marginal effects of  independent variables across 
dyads than do the linear probability or logit models: 
The effect varies not only with ni across dyads but also 
withxi and all the logit curves. Although each element 
in the summation is limited in size, the combination of 
all the terms can produce wide differences. 
More generally, what makes neural network models 
attractive as statistical models is  that they provide a 
class  of  functional  forms  that  can  approximate any 
hypothetical relationship between ni and Xi, given a 
large enough choice for the number of  logit functions Improving Quantitative Studies of  International Conflict: A Conjecture  March 2000 
M (Hornik  1990; White 1992, 12-28).'j  Although the 
functional form  in  equation  3 has  a fair number  of 
adjustable parameters (M(k + 2) + I),  in comparison 
to other flexible functions that also have general ap- 
proximation capabilities, such as those based on poly- 
nomial spline or trigonometric functions (e.g., Gallant 
1981),  neural  networks  normally  require  far  fewer 
parameters  to  model  the  same  level  of  complexity 
(Barron 1993). They are often described as occupying a 
middle  range  between  standard  parametric  models, 
with a small number of parameters, and nonparametric 
models, with almost infinite flexibility (Ripley 1996). 
Neural networks allow for a wide variability of  mar- 
ginal effects, and their flexibility and general approxi- 
mation  capabilities  far  outperform  standard  logit- 
based interaction models. 
Is there a middle ground between the simple logit 
model and the more complicated neural network ap- 
proach? One possibility is generalized additive models 
(GAMs), which  are more flexible than logit because 
they permit nonmonotonicities in the probability of  a 
conflict, but they do not allow relationships as rich as 
neural networks because most interactions are disal- 
lowed (Beck and Jackrnan 1998). Our extensive exper- 
iments with these and other approaches caused us to 
conclude that only neural network models capture the 
full nature  of  the substantive relationships  in  these 
data. Of  course, one could go  even farther, toward 
more flexible relationships, such as through the use of 
nonparametric  methods.  Perhaps  future  researchers 
will find some of  these techniques appropriate, but to 
date we have not found that the additional flexibility is 
warranted.  Finally,  we  do  not  believe  that  neural 
network models should in all cases replace logit models 
in quantitative studies of international conflict, but our 
results seem to indicate they have a place in the toolkit 
of  international relations researchers. Further work is 
needed to build theories based on the structure uncov- 
ered, and  other research  may  indeed  discover more 
parsimonious methods. 
Issues in Neural Network Modeling 
The use of neural networks involves the same issues of 
model selection, estimation, interpretation, and infer- 
ence as for any other statistical model. Some of  these 
issues are more common in models with flexible func- 
tional forms, like ours, and so demand special atten- 
tion. For example, in equation 3, how do we choose the 
size  of  M?  How  do we  compare  results  from  the 
different  models?  For  a  given  model,  how  are  the 
parameter  values  determined?  How  are they  inter- 
The large variety of  neural network models includes many that are 
even more general than equation 3, as they allow additional levels of 
hierarchy,  stacking functions within functions,  and feed-backward 
effects (as in the so-called recurrent neural networks [Holland 19981, 
which are appropriate for modeling time series data). In addition, 
one  can  choose  functions  other  than  logit  or even  mix  several 
different functions in the same analysis. Neural network models also 
can be used  with  stochastic components other  than  Bernoulli  to 
model different types of  dependent variables. 
preted?  How  does statistical inference proceed,  and 
how do we handle uncertainty? 
Recent developments in Bayesian methods for neu- 
ral  networks allow  disciplined  treatment  of  each  of 
these  questions. We  adopt  the Bayesian framework 
with  normal  approximation  (MacKay  1992a, 1992b, 
1992c, 1994), which is discussed in the Appendix. Here 
we highlight some of  its basic ideas in connection with 
the questions raised above. 
The central feature of  the Bayesian approach is to 
treat  everything  as  probabilistic. Hence,  instead  of 
estimating the "true" values of  some fixed parameters, 
we look for their posterior distributions given the data. 
Model  building  and  inference  is  then  a  process  of 
updating our beliefs about the world using the infor- 
mation we receive from empirical data. In the normal 
approximation  framework  for  neural  networks,  we 
assume normal prior distributions for the parameters P 
and y that are centered on zero; that is, we believe it 
more  likely  that  the parameters take smaller values 
than larger ones. This prior merely reflects the com- 
mon belief that a certain degree of "smoothness" in the 
underlying data-generating function is likely (smaller 
parameter values result in smoother functions, since 
the logit transformation is flattened as the parameter 
values decrease). We then apply Bayes's  theorem  to 
evaluate the posterior  distribution of  the parameters 
used  to  evaluate  the  predictive  distribution  of  the 
dependent variable  (by  integrating  out  the parame- 
ters).  For  complex  functions  like  neural  networks, 
there are no analytical solutions for the integration, 
and Monte Carlo methods of sampling the distribution 
are computationally very burdensome. Hence, we fol- 
low MacKay (1994) and approximate various interme- 
diate distributions with normals, since they are analyt- 
ically  easy  to  treat  and  simple  to  sample  (see  the 
Appendix). This enables us to arrive at the posterior 
probability of n,,  given our data. 
How to Select M and Avoid Overfitting.  In conventional 
(non-Bayesian) neural networks, selection of  M, the 
number of  logit curves, is an important issue, as too 
large M can cause "overfitting." Overfitting is a danger 
with  any statistical model, but  especially so for very 
flexible forms. A model that is  too flexible picks up 
idiosyncrasies unique  to a particular  data set  rather 
than the structural features of the world that pertain to 
out-of-sample data. The  danger  is  always  real,  and 
many attempts have been made to develop procedures 
that  protect  against it. Of  course, "underfitting"  (or 
missing relationships of interest) is a danger as well, so 
there is good reason to think that M > 1. 
In the Bayesian framework, the presence of  smooth 
priors  for  the parameters  significantly alleviates the 
problem of overfitting. Instead of  searching for the set 
of  parameter values that maximize the model perfor- 
mance on the training data, we look instead for solu- 
tions that at the same time punish model complexity. 
More important (in principle at least), in the Bayesian 
paradigm no single model is the correct one. Rather, 
because each alternative is correct with some probabil- 
ity, different models can be compared by examining the American Political Science Review  Vol. 94. No. 1 
measures of  evidence for them.7 In practice, however, 
there is a fairly straightforward test of whether one is 
finding structure or overfitting ephemera. The proce- 
dure is to set aside a portion of the data as a "test set," 
fit the model to the remaining data (the "training set"), 
and see whether the forecasts hold up.8 Because there 
is  always the tendency to iterate back  and forth be- 
tween fitting models to the training set and verifying 
the model in the test set, we set aside two test sets, the 
second of which we did not consult until all exploratory 
work was completed. This second test set was used only 
to  compare  the  performance  of  the  chosen  neural 
network specification and the corresponding logit spec- 
ification. 
Interpretation.  The neural network literature is con- 
cerned almost exclusively with pattern recognition and 
forecasting, and the issue of  interpreting the effect of 
the explanatory variables on ni  has not received much 
attention. In political science research, however, inter- 
pretation of causal effects is equally critical. The prob- 
lem is that the functional form is so flexible, and the 
estimated relationships between ni  and Xi  can be so 
complicated, that the parameters (P(,), . . . ,  P(,)  and 
yo, . . . , yM) are almost  impossible  to  interpret  di- 
rectly. We have created a graphical device that enables 
us to produce highly interpretable results. For example, 
we  can  plot  the expected value  of  (and  confidence 
intervals for) the probability of  conflict by  one or two 
explanatory variables, while  holding  the  remainder 
constant  at  chosen values.  Of  course,  since  neural 
networks allow estimation of  different effects for dif- 
ferent observations, the values held constant are criti- 
cal features of  interpretation. The identical methods 
can be used with regression models but are not needed 
because the effect parameters are constant, and so the 
whole functional relationship can be easily summarized 
with a single number. We elaborate on these methods 
of  interpretation later. 
Of course, in practice, interpretation is a problem for 
any  statistical model  beyond  the very  simple linear 
additive setup. That is why we introduce several graph- 
ical procedures  for interpreting  the results of  neural 
networks. 
Possible Objections to Neural Networks 
Neural  networks  come  with  considerable  baggage; 
some criticism is deserved, some not. Before going into 
There are theoretical  results that  can help with overfitting. For 
example, Neal (1996) proves that a Bayesian neural network can use 
an infinite number of logit curves without causing improper behavior 
in the output function, provided that the prior variances are properly 
scaled. He suggests one should choose the most complicated model 
that is computationally feasible (the largest possible M) and scale the 
variance of the priors so that it is related to model complexity. This 
way, one has a model capable of  extracting as much information as 
possible, but the data are taxed to the same degree. Unfortunately, 
this requires use of  extremely time-consuming computational algo- 
rithms, as discussed in the Appendix. 
Validation with training and test sets can be improved in theory 
with such techniques as cross-validation, which breaks the data set 
into all possible splits. In practice, most users keep a single test set 
aside. 
a detailed  analysis using neural nets  in  the study of 
conflict, it would be helpful to put to rest a few issues 
that may  come to mind when the term "neural net- 
works" is used. 
First, neural networks are sometimes treated  as a 
black box for classifying very complex data patterns in 
the absence of  theory (e.g., handwriting recognition). 
In contrast, we hypothesize that for international con- 
flict  data there are massive nonlinear  interactive ef- 
fects, and only the confluence of  many causal factors 
leads to a nontrivial increase in the probability of war. 
This allows us to interpret the output of the model in a 
way  that  is  useful  for  the  international  relations 
scholar, not simply as a black box that does a good job 
of classifying which observations are more or less likely 
to be conflictual. 
Second, why  neural networks? Would  simpler and 
more  well-known  interactive  methods  work  better? 
The answer is no. Linear or logit models can include 
multiplicative interactions, but these have not worked 
well in practice. Even bivariate multiplicative interac- 
tions have not performed well because of  multicolin- 
earity.  Our  evidence  indicates  that  interactions  in 
international  conflict  are  considerably  complicated. 
We  need  a  method  that  can  deal  with  massively 
nonadditive interactions, not one that  can be grudg- 
ingly "tricked" into allowing for a few simple interac- 
tions. 
Third, early research  in  neural  networks stressed 
nonstatistical pattern recognition, but we rely on more 
recent  work  that  puts  neural  networks  on  a  firm 
statistical foundation. We use more complex variants 
of well-known statistical models, and they come with all 
the standard apparatus for validating and comparing 
models and avoiding unnecessarily complex specifica- 
tions.  If  our  conjecture  is  false,  and  simple  logit 
performs as well as complex neural net models, then 
the in-sample and especially the out-of-sample fore- 
casts will clearly indicate this. The statistical basis of 
our work means we need not fear that neural nets are 
just very good at picking up in-sample idiosyncrasies in 
the data.9 
Fourth, we guard against overfitting by  relying ex- 
tensively  on  out-of-sample forecasts to validate  our 
models. If  neural nets do not detect "real" properties 
of  conflict  data,  merely  idiosyncratic patterns,  then 
they will yield good in-sample but poor out-of-sample 
forecasts. Many of  the problems associated with early 
nonstatistical neural network models can be avoided by 
using only models with a firm statistical basis and then 
evaluating the performance of  all models with out-of- 
sample forecasts. 
In brief, neural nets have a venerable history with 
9 The simple logit is not formally nested within the neural nets we 
use,  but  in  the  data  analysis presented  below,  the  forecasting 
performance  of  the neural network is so overwhelmingly superior 
that any criteria for discriminating between nonnested  alternatives 
would clearly choose it over the logit. This does not imply the choice 
of neural network specification, or any other statistical specification, 
is a purely mechanical task. Art is involved in any model choice, and 
no less so in the choice of  a particular neural net specification. But 
the out-of-sample forecast test guards against being "too artful." Improving Quantitative Studies of  International Conflict: A Conjecture  March 2000 
numerous success stories. Many criticisms apply to the 
early nonstatistical variants. Modern neural nets are as 
firm  a  part  of  statistics as  are its  simpler variants, 
starting with the logit. As long. as we use techniques 
that  allow  empirical  work  to  discern  whether  the 
additional  complexity is  both  necessary  and  useful, 
there should be no reason to fear and much to gain 
from the newer, more sophisticated, methods. 
FORECASTING AND EXPLAINING 
POSTWAR CONFLICT 
In this section we discuss the data and model, forecast- 
ing performance,  and  causal structure in the model 
results. 
Data and Model 
In order to test our conjecture, we use the standard 
dyad-year  design, with  the same  data  and variables 
employed repeatedly in the scholarly literature. This 
eliminates the  possibility that  the  improved perfor- 
mance of our model is due to better data. For similar 
reasons, we limit ourselves to politically relevant dyads 
(PRDs), that is, pairs of essentially contiguous states or 
with  at  least one major power, on the grounds that 
non-PRDs are unlikely to engage in militarized con- 
flict.  We  thus  focus  on  the  harder  test  of  finding 
variable  effects  among  this  more  selected  homoge- 
neous set of  dyads. 
Specifically,  we  use  data  compiled  by  Richard 
Tucker  (1997)  from  a variety of  sources.lO The  set 
contains  23,529  dyad-years between  1947 and  1989. 
The dependent variable is coded one for dyad-years 
with a new "militarized interstate dispute" (MID), zero 
otherwise (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer, 
and  Singer  1996), with  years  of  MID  after  onset 
dropped. MIDs are rare, occurring in only 976 (4.1%) 
of  dyad-years. 
The  explanatory  variables  include  dummies  for 
whether the dyad contains geographically contiguous 
countries (Contiguous) and is allied in defense pacts, 
neutrality pacts,  or ententes (Ally). The similarity of 
state preferences between two partners (Similarity) is 
measured, as usual, by the resemblance in their alliance 
portfolios. The similarity data we use  here are from 
Tucker (1999) and are based on a measure developed 
by Signorino and Ritter (1999); the measure runs from 
-1  to 1, where 1  indicates maximal alliance portfolio 
similarity. The imbalance of  power  within  the  dyad 
(Asymmetry) is measured by the Ray and Singer (1973) 
index of relative capabilities of the dyadic partners. It is 
continuous, ranging from 0 to 1; 1 indicates that  all 
military capability is held by  one partner, whereas 0 
indicates an exact division between the two. 
The  key  variable  in  many  conflict  studies  is  the 
degree  of  democratization  of  the  dyad.  We  use  a 
slightly updated measure from the Polity I11 (Jaggers 
and Gurr 1996) data set. As is common, we measure 
lo The measures are more fully described in the Appendix. The data 
set is archived on the APSR web site. 
each partner's democracy by the difference between its 
"democracy~'  and "autocracy" scores. This differenced 
measure ranges from -10  (extreme autocracy) to +I0 
(maximal democracy). Conflict scholars have debated 
about  the  proper  way  to  construct  a  single  dyadic 
democracy index from the two  measured  democracy 
scores, but it is easy enough to enter both (Dem a and 
Dem b) into the analysis.ll 
Finally, we  use the number  of  years since the last 
conflict (Peace Years) as a measure of temporal depen- 
dence  (Beck, Katz, and  Tucker  1998). This variable 
controls for the possibility that conflict is more likely to 
erupt after previous disputes than after a long period of 
peace. As Beck, Katz, and Tucker show, the addition of 
this variable  turns  an  ordinary  logit  analysis  into  a 
grouped proportional hazard model.12 
We divided the data into an in-sample training set, 
1947-85,  which we  use  to fit  the model, and  a test/ 
validation set, 1986-89,  which was used only once to 
evaluate the forecasts. We fit the neural network model 
in equation 3 to the training set. Without looking at the 
test  set, we  experimented with  setting M to various 
values. We did this by putting aside different portions 
of the 1947-85  data and trying different values of M (in 
the spirit of cross-validation). Only after we completed 
this testing did we look at the 1986-89  data.13 We also 
fit  a  standard  logit  model  to  the  training  set  for 
comparison. 
We found that an M set around 25 provided about 
the right level of  flexibility and predictability for our 
data (see the Appendix). This seemingly large value is 
counterbalanced by  our priors, which favor small val- 
ues for all parameters. This means the model in total is 
a  very  flexible  functional  form  that  heavily  favors 
smooth curves with few bends. Deviations from this 
smoothness only  occur when the data provide clear 
evidence to the contrary. That is, unlike logit models 
and other low-dimensional  parametric forms, when the 
data speak loudly enough, the fit responds. 
l1 For each observation, we randomly assign A to one dyadic partner 
and  B  to  the  other, which  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesized 
symmetric effect (and  confirmed  by  our empirical  analyses). The 
traditional approach of creating a single index similarly treats the two 
countries as symmetric and exchangeable. For simplicity of presen- 
tation, we chose not to do this for asymmetry as well, although it 
would be a reasonable approach to explore. 
l2  For most  complicated  maximum likelihood  models, such as for 
duration or count data, neural nets can be used to replace the simple 
specification that the underlying mean is a linear function of the data 
with one that the mean is a massively interactive function of the data. 
As  of  now, no off-the-shelf software can do this, but programming 
these more complicated models is straightfonvard if  nontrivial. We 
focus here only on the binary outcome case. 
l3 The 1947-85  data were randomly divided into training and test 
sets of  equal size. The random split was possible because the peace 
years  variable  induced  conditional temporal  independence. As  a 
further check on the choice of M, the pre-1986 data were split again, 
and the choice of M was rechecked and validated with the new test 
set. We chose to do final validation on the data split temporally, that 
is, the last four years of the data set, to provide a tougher test for the 
neural net forecasts. The use  of  this hold-out set also makes  our 
validation look more like a true forecasting exercise. American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 1 
TABLE 1.  Logit and Neural Network Forecasting Performance 
Conflict: % Correct  Number  Peace: % Correct  Number 
Year  Loait  N  N  of 1s  Loait  N  N  of 0s 
1947-85  0  25.3  892  100  99.58  20,155 
1986  0  18.5  27  100  99.83  584 
1987  0  14.3  28  100  98.98  587 
1988  0  23.1  13  100  99.34  609 
1989  0  12.5  16  100  99.51  61 8 
1986-89  0  16.7  84  100  99.42  2,398 
Total  0  24.6  976  100  99.57  22,553 
Forecasts 
Table 1 gives one view of  the comparative forecasting 
performance  of  the  logit  and  neural  network  (NN) 
models. In the table, we divide the forecasts into conflict 
(1) and peace (0). The left-hand portion reports success 
at forecasting conflict when it  occurred, and the right- 
hand  portion  gives  success at forecasting no  conflict 
when there was none. As is clear, since the logit model 
never forecasts that a conflict will occur in any one dyad 
(i.e., the probability  never  reaches  0.50),  it  forecasts 
incorrectly for all the cases of  conflict and correctly for 
all  the cases  of  peace.14  This is  no  great  success, of 
course, since the optimistic claim that conflict will never 
occur is correct 96% of  the time! 
The table  indicates that  the  neural  network model 
performs substantially better than the logit, using the 
identical set of explanatory variables. It is nearly as good 
as the logit at predicting peace, with  all probabilities 
exceeding 99% correct. More important, when military 
conflict  occurs,  the  neural  network  model  makes  a 
successful forecast 16.7% of  the time. This is not high in 
an absolute sense, but it is much better than the logit 
success rate  of  zero.  Given the high costs of  military 
conflict and the tremendous benefits of  knowing ahead 
of  time when a war will occur, this improved forecasting 
performance could be of  significant policy value. More 
significant, from  our  perspective, is  that  the model's 
forecasting performance confirms a durable causal struc- 
ture. The relatively high percentage of successful predic- 
tions is within a reasonably narrow range, from 12.5% to 
23.1%, for each of  the four out-of-sample years, which 
further  confirms  the  overall result  with  separate,  al- 
though not independent, observable implications. Fur- 
thermore, most of these figures are lower than their fit to 
the training set, which is as it should be if  we expect not 
only structure but  also change in  the real world. The 
model predicts 25.3% of conflicts correctly in-sample but 
only 16.7% correctly out-of-sample, which indicates ei- 
l4 If  the costs of  misclassifying wars versus peace differ, then decision 
theory  indicates  that  one should  merely  change  the  threshold  of 
prediction  from  the  0.50  that  is  used  here and in virtually all  the 
literature. But that would  merely increase  the predictions  of  1 and 
correspondingly decrease the predictions of 0 with no other changes in 
the statistical model and/or interpretation, so we retain the traditional 
0.50 cutoff. Figure 1, below, demonstrates that the neural net, but not 
the logit, fits well for any chosen threshold. The 0.50 threshold seems 
the most appropriate to us, but none of our comparisons depend on it, 
and  there  is  no  choice  of  threshold  that  would  make  the  logit's 
performance close to the performance of the neural net. 
ther slight overfitting (the difference is just  outside 
the 95% confidence interval) or change in  the real 
world after 1985.15 
Table  1 demonstrates  that  the  neural  network 
model discriminates far better than the logit model by 
assigning very different probabilities of  international 
conflict to the available dyads. It does not indicate 
whether either model's probability values are correct 
except  for  above  and  below  the  0.50  mark.  For 
example,  if  we  observe  1,000  dyads  with  a  0.10 
probability of  going to war, none of  these individual 
pairs would be predicted to fight, but we would expect 
to see 100 wars from somewhere in the set. We now 
evaluate the extent to which the two model's predic- 
tions have this desirable characteristic. 
We begin by computing predicted probabilities for 
each dyad from the logit and neural network models. 
We then sort these into bins of 0.1 width: [O, 0.1), [0.1, 
0.2), . . . ,  [0.9, 11. Within each bin, we  compute the 
mean predicted probability (which presumably will be 
near its respective midpoint) as well as the observed 
fraction of  1s in  each bin. We compare the two to 
check the fit of  the model in the training set and to 
evaluate the forecasts in the test set. Figure 1 plots 
these numbers for both statistical models. 
The in-sample graph in  Figure  1 shows that  the 
predicted probabilities and observed fraction of  con- 
flict  match  fairly  closely  for  the  neural  network 
model. The logit model is reasonably close as well 
when the mean probability is 0.25 or less, but it does 
much worse for higher (i.e., more interesting) pre- 
dicted probabilities. This is especially important from 
our perspective: The logit model not only predicts 
peace breaking out all over but also becomes more 
inaccurate  as  the  probability of  conflict  increases, 
even though these cases are very rare.16 In contrast, 
l5 The logit model is the standard in international relations, but it 
is  interesting  to compare our results  to that  of  a GAM. Using 
identical explanatory variables, the GAM forecast slightly better 
than logit but much worse than a neural network. Using the same 
comparisons as in Table 1, the GAM correctly predicted 5.6% of all 
in-sample disputes (and 99.9% of  all nondisputes).  Similarly, the 
GAM equivalent of Figure 1  showed performance that was slightly 
better than the logit but much worse than the neural network. 
The one possible exception is the last mean probability bin for 
the  logit, which  has  very  few  observations,  so  the  fraction  of 
conflicts has much higher sampling variability. (We chose not to 
add error bars for each point so that the graphs are easier to read; 
the precision with which each point is estimated is higher at the left 
than the right of the graph.) Improving Quantitative Studies of  International Conflict: A Conjecture  March 2000 
FIGURE 1.  Logit and Neural Network (NN) Probabilities versus Actual Outcomes 
In-Sample  (1  947-85) 
1 
Forecast (1  986-89) 
1 
Mean Prob(y = 1) 
Note: Probabilities from each model are sorted into bins 0.1 wide (0, 0.1:  0.1,  0.2, . . .  ) and averaged. These averages are plotted horizontally and the 
actual fraction of ones in the bin are plotted vertically. A line for a model that fits the data will differ from the (dotted) 45 degree line only by random chance. 
In both the in-sample graph (on the left) and the forecast out-of-sample graph (on the right), the fit is better for NN than logit, and, in addition, NN 
predictions exist for much higher probability bins than logit predictions. 
when the neural network model gives a probability, it is 
a  reasonably  accurate  assessment  of  the  odds  of  a 
conflict  occurring  within  the  sample.  Of  course,  an 
equally important difference between the two models is 
the much more acute discriminatory power of the neural 
network model, which we can see because the logit never 
yields any predicted probability of  conflict above 0.50. 
Whereas the in-sample graph in Figure 1  evaluates the 
fit of the two models to the same data, the out-of-sample 
graph uses the same technique to evaluate forecasting 
success. Again, there is a reasonably close correspon- 
dence between the estimated probabilities and observed 
fraction of  conflict for both models. They track  each 
other very well for the lower probability bins, indicating 
the same high level of  success. (The fact that the logit 
model did not fit well to the last two points in-sample but 
did  fit  the  out-of-sample  plot  seems  to be  a  lucky 
coincidence.) More interesting is that whereas the logit 
model has no forecasts in the high-probability region, 
the neural network model tracks the observed fractions 
reasonably well  even for  the sparsely populated  high 
probability bins. One possible problem is the noticeable 
overestimation of  conflict for the neural network model 
in this high-probability region (which indicates that our 
forecasts could be improved), but the observed numbers 
are both fairly small and not that far off. 
We believe  these  forecasts are quite solid, and  al- 
though many uncertainties remain, they seem to be far 
better than any previously produced. They are also more 
accurate than many scholars thought would be possible. 
This clearly indicates that the neural net model we use is 
superior to the logit model in our data. 
Causal Structure 
We believe our model reveals clear evidence of structure 
in international conflict data. This evidence is consistent 
with that predicted by  our conjecture about models of 
conflict. 
To interpret the results, we created what we call 
marginal  effect  graphs  that  plot  the probability of 
conflict by  one explanatory variable, holding all the 
others  constant  at  a  designated  value.  Since  our 
conjecture about conflict studies holds that the effect 
of  most variables will  be larger (i.e., more discrimi- 
nating) when the ex ante probability of war is greater, 
we  hold constant the other variables at two values: 
high and low probability of  conflict. (For simplicity, 
we compute these by the median of each explanatory 
variable among observations, where Y = 1 and Y = 
0, respectively.) 
Figure 2 presents  these graphs for the logit  and 
neural  network model for  each  of  the explanatory 
variables except democracy  (which we  will  discuss 
separately). The low and high controls for the logit 
model appear in columns one and three, and for the 
neural nets these are given in columns two and four. 
Each explanatory variable appears in a separate row; 
the vertical lines on the graph are one-standard-error 
bars surrounding the predicted probability. (Examin- 
ing results as we do, by  grouping dyads according to 
the ex ante probability of  conflict, creates no selection 
bias, nor does selecting cases based on the probability 
of  conflict,  because  the  analysis has  already been 
conducted with all dyads.) 
Substantively, the neural network analysis in Figure 
2 shows a few similarities to conventional logit anal- 
ysis, but it also demonstrates features consistent with 
our conjecture. As can be seen by  comparing the first 
and third  columns, logit analysis allows for greater 
effects of  the explanatory variables when the ex ante 
probability of  conflict is high, but the differences are 
small, and virtually all the logit effects are substan- 
tively small. Even in the high ex ante case (column 3), 
only  contiguous  and  peace  years  have  a  notable 
substantive effect on the probability of conflict. Thus, 
the logit model presented here is similar to the typical 
logit  model  of  conflict: democracy  (see  Figure  3), American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 1 
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contiguity, and peace years have statistically significant, 
though substantively small, effects on conflict, whereas 
the  other  variables  have  statistically  insignificant  (or 
marginally significant) and very small substantive influ- 
ence. 
In contrast, the neural network model produces much 
larger changes in the effect of  any variable as we move 
from  a low  to a high  ex  ante  probability of  conflict 
(compare  the  second  and  fourth  columns).  This  is 
particularly obvious for some of what normally might 
be considered "control" variables. For example, con- 
tiguity  has  a  strong  effect  on the probability of  a 
dispute in  the logit analysis, but this effect is more 
than  doubled  for  the  high-probability case  in  the 
neural network analysis. The effect of contiguity is so 
strong that it is not hidden by  the logit analysis, but 
allowing for complex interactions shows that it has the 
extremely strong influence that we would expect but Improving Quantitative Studies of  International Conflict: A Coniecture  March 2000 
that previous researchers were unable to demonstrate. 
The neural network analysis also reveals the impor- 
tance of  duration dependence (peace years) when the 
ex ante probability of  a dispute is high. Although the 
logit analysis finds some evidence of this dependence, it 
is quite modest. For high ex ante probability of  war 
situations, with a conflict occurred last year, the prob- 
ability of  another under logit analysis is less than 0.25, 
compared to almost 0.80 under neural network analy- 
sis.  It  takes  about  a  decade  for  this  probability to 
recede  to  nearly zero.  Clearly, both  analyses give  a 
similar pattern of  decay, but the more flexible NN gives 
a much higher maximum probability of  a dispute. The 
effect of  the duration of  peace on the probability of  a 
dispute is clearly underestimated  in the logit analysis. 
Duration dependence is sufficiently strong to emerge in 
the  logit  analysis  to  some  degree,  but  the  lack  of 
interactions in that model does not allow us to discern 
how critical time is in forecasting future disputes. 
NN also reveals that two important determinants of 
disputes, similarity and asymmetry, have a very strong 
but  nonmonotonic  effect  on  probability.  The  logit 
analysis assumes that all effects are monotonic and so 
cannot  detect  these kinds of  relationships. The NN 
analysis reveals a stronger and more complex associa- 
tion between these variables and conflict.l7 
Our findings of  nonmonotonic effects are consistent 
with  the  more  game-theoretic  studies  of  Bueno  de 
Mesquita  and Lalman  (1992)  and  Signorino (1999). 
Both similarity and asymmetry are the two  standard 
measures  of  the benefits  and  costs  of  conflict.  For 
example, these theories  assume that  as one side ac- 
quires  comparatively  more  military  capability,  the 
probability of conflict will rise and then fall, but no logit 
model in the literature or here supports this claim for 
either asymmetry or similarity, or even indicates that 
either has  results of  any  kind  of  important size. In 
contrast, the NN results reveal both are very important 
in  high  ex ante probability dyads in just  the manner 
predicted by  theory. Indeed, in the high ex ante prob- 
ability  dyads, a  large  change  in  either  similarity or 
asymmetry can increase or decrease the probability of 
conflict by  more than 50 points. 
Finally, NN models show a clear influence of  dyadic 
democracy  on the probability  of  conflict.  The  logit 
analysis, which averages effects over all dyads, shows a 
small but significant pacific effect of  democracy. The 
linear nature of the logit model requires that the effects 
of  each partner's  democracy scores be  additive. The 
l7 AS a diagnostic, we also applied generalized additive models to the 
data. GAMs reveal nonmonotonic effects for these two variables, but 
their influence, which is averaged over all cases, is substantively much 
smaller than the effects found by the neural net for the high ex ante 
probability  cases.  Furthermore,  the  GAM  effects, which  are  the 
"average"  of  the  NN  effects over  all  combinations of  the  other 
independent variables, are dissimilar to the NN effects shown. This 
must be the case if the NN effects at the differing combinations of the 
independent variables are different; the GAM cannot accommodate 
this.  Of  course,  logit  models  can  be  "tricked"  into  allowing for 
nonmonotonicities, although these must be specified in advance. As 
with linear regression, in practice it is hard to get good logit estimates 
of  nonmonotonic effects because of  multicolinearity  and the arbi- 
trariness of  nonmonotonic specifications. 
contour plots implied by the NN model, given in Figure 
3, show that the pacific effect of  democracy is nil when 
the ex ante probability of  conflict is low but is strong 
when the probability is high.  In the latter  case, the 
maximal influence of  a movement on the democracy 
scale is about 40  points, much larger than any effect 
found in the logit analysis. The nonmonotonicity and 
nonadditivity allowed by the NN model reveals that the 
pacific effects are strongest when both partners score 
high  on the democracy  scale and  are much  smaller 
substantively in the rest of  the plot. Interestingly, the 
most quarrelsome dyads are those in which both part- 
ners have a middling democracy score.18 
Dyads containing an  extreme  autocracy are more 
likely to fight than are very democratic dyads, but they 
are less likely to fight than dyads with middling democ- 
racy. This effect is found only in the NN analysis, which 
both allows for massive interactions and nonmonotonic 
effects of  individual variables. In other words, democ- 
racy does have pacific  effects, but  only among dyads 
that  are otherwise likely  to be  conflictual and  only 
among the most democratic nations. A portion of  that 
effect  is  strong enough to emerge  even in  the logit 
model, which averages small and large effects, but its 
substantial influence is seen only in the NN  analysis. 
Thus, democratic peace  theorists  such  as  Maoz and 
Russett  (1994)  appear  to  be  right,  although  they 
heavily underestimate  the pacific effect when democ- 
racy is important and overestimate it in cases in which 
democracy matters little. 
The simple plots we provide here cannot, of  course, 
demonstrate the full structure of  the neural network or 
its power. That is more clearly shown in its ability to 
forecast disputes much better than any linear or addi- 
tive analysis. Yet, these plots do show that our results 
are stronger than those found by  more standard meth- 
ods and  that  neural  nets  can find contingent causal 
structures missed by  the simpler, uncontingent, logit 
model. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have proposed a simple conjecture that appears to 
explain  a  significant  and  well-known  problem  with 
international conflict studies. The conjecture is consis- 
tent with a variety of implications we can observe from 
the literature. It also suggests a set of  specific problems 
with the most  common statistical model used in the 
field. To evaluate our conjecture, we adapted a statis- 
tical model that  better  matches the features of  our 
conjecture  and,  as  a  consequence,  the  substantive 
concerns of  quantitative  and  qualitative researchers. 
The result is  a superior  statistical model of  interna- 
tional  conflict.  It  appears  to  be  the  only  large-N 
statistical model that estimates the probability of  any 
international  conflict at some level  higher than 0.50 
1s  In the postwar data there are relatively few dyads in the interior of 
the plot. Therefore, the confidence intervals, which would be difficult 
to show in this type of graph, are much wider in the middle region. 
Since the confidence intervals for Figure 3 are a function of several 
model parameters, they would be most easily computed using the 
simulation technique described in King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000. American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 1 
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(ours exceeds 0.90 for some cases). We  are able to 
predict about 17% of  conflicts from data on the years 
prior to the conflict. 
This  forecasting result  can  only  be  driven by  an 
underlying structure of  international politics that stays 
relatively stable over time. Confirming the existence of 
and understanding this structure has been a holy grail 
in  quantitative  conflict  studies,  and  we  believe  our 
neural network approach represents progress toward 
this goal. Along with the graphical tools we introduce, 
these models may have the potential to uncover struc- 
ture in other areas. 
Neural networks are computationally and intellectu- 
ally complex, but they are no more than extensions of 
standard interactive models. While early neural net- 
work research often seemed to overfit the data, new 
Bayesian analysis can surmount much of that problem. 
It seems unlikely that the effect of  any variable com- 
monly used in the field is completely independent of 
the levels of  other variables, as standard approaches 
assume. Neural networks are designed to unlock such 
complicated structures. There is no question that they 
do a wonderful job  of  recognizing patterns in other 
disciplines, but  they also can find complicated struc- 
tural  regularities  in  standard  international  relations 
conflict data. 
APPENDIX: BAYESIAN METHODS FOR 
NEURAL NETWORK MODELS 
The Model 
The basic  neural  network  model  we  estimate is  given  in 
equation 3. To it we add a standard Bayesian setup to shrink 
the parameter  space.19 We do this by  adding two levels of 
hierarchy. First, we assume independent normal distributions 
N(0,  l/a,) for each group of the parameters (and hence the 
l9  The explanatory variables are normalized before being input to the 
neural net to improve computational accuracy. All interpretations in 
this articIe are based on the original, unnormalized  measures. Improving Quantitative Studies of  International Conflict: A Conjecture  March 2000 
index h),  with one for the constant terms p,,  one for each 
element of  p  other than p,,  and one for the set of elements 
of  y. In addition, for each of  the a,  elements, which control 
how strongly any parameter is influenced by  its prior to be 
small, we assume an (uninformative) improper uniform prior 
distribution (which is one way  of  expressing a degree of  igno- 
rance or uncertainty about which values are more or less likely). 
As  discussed in  the text, we  select M in the model  by 
comparing the test set performance of  models with different 
M's. M should be  large  enough for the model  to be ade- 
quately  complex and is  theoretically  unrestricted  in  mag- 
nitude  in  the  Bayesian  setting.  In  the  interest  of  model 
parsimony and computational efficiencylfeasibility, we follow 
the general practice of  searching for the smallest possible M 
that gives satisfactory performance and restricting the total 
number of  parameters in the resulting model (M(k + 2) + 
1, where k is the number of  independent variables) to not 
exceed n/10. To this end we experimented with M set at 5,10, 
15, 20,  25,  30,  35,  40,  50.20  Since  the  testhalidation  set 
performance  of  models with M  around  25  was  obviously 
better than around 20, and an M larger than 25 did not yield 
significant improvement, we set M at 25.21 
The Posterior Distribution of the 
Parameters 
By  Bayes's theorem, the posterior distribution is, of  course, 
the  product  of  the prior  distributions  and  the  likelihood 
function: 
where  IT^, the probability of  conflict, is defined in the second 
and third lines of equation 3.22 
Ideally, we would be able to draw random samples of y, P, 
and a directly from this posterior distribution  to compute 
quantities of  interest. Indeed, this  has been  accomplished 
with  a  hybrid  version  of  Markov  Chain  Monte  Carlo 
(MCMC) methods (Neal 1996). Yet, runs that provide exact 
draws from  the  posterior  with  MCMC  methods  take  an 
inordinately long time to complete. The method also has all 
the usual problems caused by a lack of agreement on how to 
assess stochastic convergence in MCMC algorithms. 
After trying Neal's  approach, we felt that more time to 
experiment  with  different  specifications to understand  the 
data was necessary, so we adopted the normal approximation 
20 Estimation  was  via  the EM algorithm that  alternates the error 
function minimization with respect to y and P given or,  and the value 
updating of  or,,  given y and P. Optimization used conjugate gradients, 
with initial weights randomized and all training data (no noise added 
to inputs) presented in a batch. The cutoff criterion for the training 
process was an error tolerance of  0.00001. 
21  Given our large sample size, this seemingly large M actually yields 
a ratio of  parameters to data points that is smaller than typical and 
considerably smaller once we take into account the prior. 
22 Note that the model  is  technically unidentified,  although  in an 
inconsequential manner. Switching y,  with y,  and &,)with P(,  yields 
identical values for mi.  This causes no problems for our computation 
of  the various marginal effects of the independent variables. It could 
cause problems in applying standard optimization  algorithms, but 
computationally efficient techniques  that  have been  developed  to 
evaluate the gradient work well despite this problem  (Bishop 1995, 
141). 
approach (MacKay 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1994).23  It approx- 
imates the posterior distribution of  the model parameters as 
multivariate normal, which makes analytic solutions possible. 
As in standard maximum likelihood estimation, the variance 
matrix of  the parameter estimates is found by  inverting the 
He~sian.'~ 
Posterior Probabilities of Conflict 
One of  our goals is  to generate forecasts  of  international 
conflict. The other is to see how these forecasts would change 
in  accord  with  various  configurations  of  the  explanatory 
variables,Xi. For both goals, we need to specify the posterior 
probability of the forecasts. 
Conceptually, computing the forecast posterior is  simple 
and in principle can be accomplished by the usual simulation 
methods that apply to virtually every other statistical model 
(see  King,  Tomz,  and  Wittenberg  2000).  That  is,  draw 
random samples of  P, y, and a from their posterior distribu- 
tion  in equation 4 (or their asymptotic normal approxima- 
tion), insert them into the functional form in the second and 
third lines of  equation 3 to compute T,, and take a random 
draw from a Bernoulli distribution with this parameter (the 
first line of  equation 3). In practice, we use MacKay7s  (1994) 
faster analytical approximations to accomplish the same task. 
The Data 
The data set used  here was provided  by  Richard  Tucker 
(1997), and corresponds to the data used in Beck and Tucker 
(1998). The data set consists of observations on PRDs from 
1947-89  (or a shorter period if  earlier data was either not 
available or the dyad  became  a  PRD after  1947, usually 
because one partner became independent later than 1947). 
The peace years variable until the first dispute was coded as 
the time since a dyad became a PRD, that is, the first year a 
dyad was at risk of  a dispute was the year it became a PRD. 
Dyads that involved a major power in a region in which it had 
little  or no  interest  (e.g.,  China  in  Latin  America) were 
excluded; operational rules for this exclusion are in Tucker 
(1997). Note that excluding these dyads affects the affinity 
measure. These coding rules yielded 23,529 dyad-years. Both 
alliance data (for the similarity measure) and national capa- 
bilities data (for the asymmetry measure) were taken from 
data  sets  created  by  the  Correlates  of  War  project;  this 
project also defined the domain of  nation states which were 
used to construct the PRDs. The actual alliance data were 
provided by J. David Singer; the capabilities data were from 
Singer and Small 1993 and the system membership data were 
taken from the Peace Science Society (International) web site 
(http://pss.la.psu.edu/DATARES.HTM). 
23 The software we used to estimate the model ("Bigback5"  by David 
MacKay) is available at http://wol.ra.phy.cam.ac.uk/mackay/bigback/ 
bigback5.tar.g~. 
24 In  view  of  current  computational  limitations, we  feel  that  the 
normal  approximation  approach to Bayesian neural nets  provides 
good performance  and is, at present, more useful than the MCMC 
approach.  But,  of  course, new  computational  breakthroughs  may 
change matters,  and users  are encouraged  to explore  alternative 
methods as they become feasible. 
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